Abstract. In situations without central coordination, the price of anarchy relates the quality of any Nash equilibrium to the quality of a global optimum. Instead of assuming that all players choose their actions simultaneously, we consider games where players choose their actions sequentially. The sequential price of anarchy, recently introduced by Paes Leme, Syrgkanis, and Tardos [13], relates the quality of any subgame perfect equilibrium to the quality of a global optimum. The effect of sequential decision making on the quality of equilibria, depends on the specific game under consideration. We analyze the sequential price of anarchy for atomic congestion games with affine cost functions. We derive several lower and upper bounds, showing that sequential decisions mitigate the worst case outcomes known for the classical price of anarchy [2,5]. Next to tight bounds on the sequential price of anarchy, a methodological contribution of our work is, among other things, a "factor revealing" linear programming approach we use to solve the case of three players.
Model and Notation
We consider atomic congestion games with affine cost functions. The input of an instance I ∈ I consists of a finite set of resources R, a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, and for each player i ∈ N a collection A i of possible actions A i ⊆ R. We say a resource r ∈ R is chosen by player i if r ∈ A i , where A i is the action chosen by player i. By A = (A i ) i∈N we denote a possible outcome, that is, a complete profile of actions chosen by all players i ∈ N .
Each resource r ∈ R has a constant activation cost d r ≥ 0 and a variable cost or weight w r ≥ 0 that expresses the fact that the resource gets more congested the more players choose it. The total cost of resource r ∈ R, for outcome A, is then f r (A) = d r +w r ·n r (A), where n r (A) denotes the number of players choosing resource r in A. Given outcome A, the total cost of all resources chosen by player i is cost i (A) = r∈Ai f r (A). Players aim to minimize their costs. The total cost over all players of an outcome A is denoted by cost(A) = i∈N cost i (A).
Note that this class of problems includes as a special case the celebrated network routing games as studied e.g. in [2, 15] . Another special case is singleton
Research supported by CTIT (www.ctit.nl) and 3TU.AMI (www.3tu.nl), project "Mechanisms for Decentralized Service Systems". congestion games, where actions A i are all singletons, |A i | = 1. This model, and variants thereof, are also known as load balancing games and, with respect to the quality of equilibria, have a vast literature, e.g. [4, 11] .
Pure Nash equilibria are outcomes (A i ) i∈N in which no player can decrease his costs by unilaterally deviating from choosing A i . The price of anarchy PoA [9] , measures the quality of any Nash equilibrium relative to the quality of a globally optimal allocation, OP T . Here OP T is an outcome minimizing the total costs over all players 1 . Our goal is to compare the quality of Nash equilibria to the quality of subgame perfect equilibria of an extensive form game as introduced in [10, 16] . We assume that the players choose their actions in an arbitrary, predefined order 1, 2, . . . , n, so that the i-th player must choose his action A i , observing the actions of players preceding i, but not knowing the actions of the players succeeding him. A strategy S i then specifies for player i the actions he chooses, one for each potential profile of actions chosen by his predecessors 1, . . . , i − 1. We denote by S a strategy profile (S i ) i∈N . The outcome A(S) = (A(S) i ) i∈N of a game is then the set of actions chosen by each player resulting from a given strategy profile S. We denote by cost(S) the cost in the outcome A(S).
Extensive form games can be represented in a game tree, with the nodes on one level representing the possible situations that a single player can encounter, and the edges emanating from any node representing the possible actions of that player in the given situation. The nodes of the game tree are also called information sets 2 . Subgame perfect equilibria are defined by Selten [16] as strategy profiles that induce Nash equilibria in any subgame of the game tree. The sequential price of anarchy of an instance I is defined by
where SPE(I) denotes the set of subgame perfect equilibria of instance I in extensive game form, and OP T (I) denotes a social optimum outcome of I. The sequential price of anarchy of a class of instances I is defined as in [13] by SPoA(I) = sup I∈I SPoA(I). Throughout the paper, when the class of instances is clear from the context, we write PoA and SPoA. Also, we use OP T and SPE to denote optimal and subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes respectively.
Related Work and Contribution
Recently, the sequential price of anarchy was introduced by Paes Leme et al.
[13] as an alternative way to measure the costs of decentralization. Compared to the classical price of anarchy of Papadimitriou and Koutsoupias [9] , it avoids
